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NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE IN NORTH DAKOTA
ALExANDER HOLTZOFF*

The

adoption by any state of the simple Federal Civil Procedure is
an important milestone in the progress of law reform. Consequently, those who are interested in the advancement of the movement for simplification of judicial procedure, the elimination of unnecessary technicalities, and the reduction of the cost of litigation,
are at this time directing hopeful eyes at North Dakota. They are
ready to acclaim the entry of this great State into the ranks of those
progressive jurisdictions that have already adopted the simplest
civil procedure yet devised in this country, and perhaps in any
place where the Anglo-American system of law prevails.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective in the
Federal courts in 1938. Since that time Colorado, New Mexico,
Arizona, Nevada, Iowa, Utah, Delaware, New Jersey, Minnesota
and Kentucky have made the new procedure applicable in their
own tribunals. Several other States have adopted selected specific
features of the Federal procedure. North Dakota and Missouri are
now in the process of introducing Federal procedure.
It is earnestly hoped that North Dakota will become a member
of this group during the current year. This State has always exhibited a forward-looking attitude toward the simplification of judicial procedure. Many years ago when code pleading came into
vogue to supplant common law pleading, North Dakota was one of
those that embraced the innovation. Now, another epoch-making
step in the direction of further simplification has been taken in the
Federal courts and in many of the States. It is fitting, therefore,
that North Dakota should be among those to join the group of
those jurisdictions that are in the front line of contemporary judicial
reform. The bench and bar of North Dakota no doubt are interested in knowing that its neighboring State of Minnesota has
adopted and promulgated the Federal Civil Procedure. The list of
States that have accepted it comprizes States of various kinds, both
in the East and in the West, in the North and in the South. Some
are industrial, others are agricultural; some are small with a concentrated density of population, while others are large with very
sparse population; some are urban, others are largely rural in char*United States District Judge for the District of Columbia; Chairman, Section of
Judicial Administration, American Bar Association.
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acter. Yet the new procedure is suitable for jurisdictions of various
types, and conditions of different kinds.
This far-reaching advance in the field of judicial procedure is
based on two fundamental principles. One is that the procedure of
the courts should be regulated by the courts themselves, as a coordinate branch of the Government, just as the Legislature likewise
governs its own procedure. This is not a novelty or an innovation,
but merely a restoration to the courts of their centuries-old power
to regulate their own pleading, practice and procedure of which
they were deprived during the Nineteenth Century. The second
basic principle is that the procedure to be adopted by the courts
should be simple, should eliminate technicalities to the utmost, and
should lead to the disposition of cases on the merits as expeditiously as practicable, with the least expense to the litigants.
Many years ago, the American Bar Association initiated a movement to confer on the Supreme Court of the United States the rulemaking power for the Federal courts, an authority which that tribunal had had continuously as to suits in equity, but not as to
actions at law. This long campaign was brought to a successful
culmination in 1934 under the leadership of Homer Cummings,
then Attorney General of the United States, when the Congress
enacted a statute vesting the rule-making power in the Supreme
Court and empowering it to unite law and equity. The rules themselves were then drafted by an Advisory Committee appointed by
the Supreme Court for that purpose. Its Chairman was former
Attorney General William D. Mitchell of Minnesota. The eminent
group headed by him, after considerable research and travail, with
the help and after consultation with bar committees throughout the
country, devised the simplest form of civil procedure yet produced
in this country. The rules were promptly approved and promulgated by the Supreme Court and became efective in 1938.
They have now been in operation for almost twenty years. They have
been tried in the crucible and have met the test successfully. They
have fulfilled their objective. They are so framed as to be suitable
not only for Federal courts in dealing with litigation of the type
that comes before those tribunals, but also for State and local judiciary. Perhaps a striking demonstration of this fact is found in the
District of Columbia, where the Federal court handles not only
Federal cases, but also those that elsewhere would find their way
into State courts, in view of the fact that the District of Columbia
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is a Federal area and, therefore, has no tribunals corresponding to
State courts of general jurisdiction.
It is not surprising .that on occasion the movement in the direction of spreading the new simplified procedure has had to overcome
inertia, or has been confronted with skepticism, and antagonism and
even with active opposition. It is natural for lawyers who have
practiced for a great many years under procedure of a particular
type, with which they have become thoroughly familiar, to be reluctant to learn a new type of practice, no matter how much simpler
and how much more desirable it may' be. This hesitancy is but a
natural concomitant of the conservatism of human nature, a characteristic that appears very strongly in the legal profession. On the
other hand, we must emphasize the obvious fact, for it is the obvious
that is frequently overlooked and forgotten, that courts exist for
the benefit of litigants and the public generally, rather than for
the advantage of lawyers. Whatever makes the attainment of
justice less technical, more expeditious, and less expensive, is desirable in the public interest. Moreover, the new generation of lawyers as they come to the bar will derive a personal advantage from.
the fact that instead of having to learn two types of procedure as
their elders were compelled to do, one prevailing in the Federal
courts, and another in their own State courts, they would be required to familiarize themselves with only one type of procedure if
the same practice is in effect in both groups of courts.
It is but natural that slight deviations should creep into the rules
in different States adopting the Federal procedure. The proposed
draft of the Rules, which North Dakota has under consideration,
contains a few differences though of only secondary importance,
from the Federal rules. It may be of interest to consider them
briefly.
There is a difference between the Federal and the proposed
North Dakota procedure as to the manner in which an action may
be commenced. In the Federal courts this is done by filing a complaint in the Clerk's office. Service of the summons and complaint
op the defendant is then made by the marshal.1 On the other hand,
it is contemplated in North Dakota proposed Rule 3 that an action
shall be instituted by the service of a summons, either with or without a complaint. The former mode has been traditionally used in
the Federal courts, as well as in many of the States, as for instance,
1. Rules 3 and 4, F.R.C.P.
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Minnesota. Some of the Code states, such as New York, have employed the latter method. Actually there is not much to choose between them, as no question of principle is involved. Both are
equally simple. The draftsmen of the Federal Rules gave the subject thorough consideration and chose the course of filing a complaint in the Clerk's Office. The only disadvantage of the proposed
North Dakota rule is that lawyers practicing both in the Federal,
and State courts, might occasionally thoughtlessly confound the
two ways of commencing suit. If the statute of limitations is about
to run, such a confusion might result disastrously.
Both under the Federal procedure and under the proposed North
Dakota practice, the plaintiff may join two claims in a single action,
even if the second claim is cognizable only after the first claim has
been prosecuted to a conclusion. Thus a claim for money damages
and a claim to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, may be joined in
the same action, without first obtaining judgment establishing the
claim for damages. The proposed North Dakota Rule 18(b) has
added an express limitation that the Rule shall not be applied to
tort cases so as to permit the joinder of a liability or indemnity insurance carrier, unless the carrier is by law or contract directly
liable to the person injured or damaged. This express provision
seems desirable. Actually, however, Federal courts do not permit
joinder under the circumstances set forth in this limitation, thereby
avoiding disclosure of the fact that the defendant is carrying liability insurance.
In actions by or against a public officer, a constructive change is
made in the Rule relating to substitution of a successor to the
public officer. Considerable hardship, injustice, and delay has resulted from the present Federal Rule, which requires the substitution to be made within a period of six months.2 A pending
amendment to the Federal rule would abrogate the six months'
limitation and would also permit an officer to sue or be sued by his
official title instead of by name. The draftsmen of the proposed
Rules for North Dakota have anticipated this amendment. This is
an important advance in the field of civil litigation involving the
Government.
The Federal rule relating to discovery and production of documents would be extended in North Dakota by authorizing motions to direct a party to file a verified list of documents or objects
which constitute or contain evidence and which are or have been
2. Rule 25(d), F.R.C.P.
3. Rule 34, F.R.C.P.
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in the possession, custody, or control of the party. The usefulness
of this provision is obvious.
An ingenious provision is contained in the Rule relating to the
service of subpoenas by adding options permitting service by registered mail, by telegraph, or by reading the subpoena over the
telephone.4 After all, the traditional form of service of process
originated in days before postal service was on a well organized
basis and before modern media of communication were even
imagined. No reason is discernible why the courts should not make
use of new social and scientific advances in this respect as they
have done in others. If it should be found in the future that this
provision operates successfully, the Supreme Court Advisory Committee might well consider introducing it into the Federal Rules.
The States are in a position to act as laboratories for experimentation and trial of innovations. If they prove successful, they can be
introduced from time to time into federal procedure.
An important deviation from Federal procedure is found in the
proposed North Dakota Rule relating to the examination of jurors
on the voir dire.5 The corresponding Federal rule vests discretion
in the trial judge either to permit counsel to conduct the interrogation, or to do so himself. This rule has proven successful in actual
operation. In a great many Federal courts, possibly in a majority,
the questioning of the panel is now conducted by the judge, who,
of course, permits counsel to suggest additional questions to him,
which he, in turn, propounds to the jurors to the extent that he
deems the queries appropriate. Most judges, who use this method,
interrogate the panel en bloc instead of pursuing the ponderous,
old-fashioned method of interrogating each juror separately with
the resultant waste of time. The consequence has been that in the
Federal courts, one no longer finds the selection of a jury taking
days or weeks, as frequently happens in State courts, especially in
cases that have attracted public notice. For example, in a notorious
murder case that was tried in a large Middle Western city about a
year ago, several weeks were consumed in selecting a jury. A
similar occurrence took place in one of the big Northwestern cities
last fall. State judges do not actually like this time consuming
process and most of them would be glad to eliminate it, but under
existing law in most States they are powerless. This useless consumption of time and the laborious interrogation of jurors individ4

4. North Dakota Rule No. 5(c) (2).
5. North Dakota Rule No. 47(a).
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ually, sometimes of an almost humiliating nature, has been a reproach to the administration of justice and has cast discredit upon
it in the eyes of thinking laymen. Moreover, this process is entirely unnecessary to achieve the ends of justice. Every party is
entitled to a fair and impartial jury. No one has a right to a favorable or an ignorant jury. Experience has shown that fair and impartial juries are obtained by the system so largely prevailing in the
Federal courts at this time, with no waste of time. It is, therefore,
to be regretted that the proposed North Dakota rule preserves the
outmoded procedure by an express provision that although the
trial court may at its option conduct a general examination of prospective jurors, "any such action on the part of the trial court shall
not in any manner limit the right of the parties or their attorneys
to conduct such examination."
The proposed North Dakota rule (Rule 59) regulating motions
for a new trial differs considerably from the corresponding Federal
rule in two respects. The Federal rule authorizes the trial court to
grant a new trial "for any of the reasons for which new trials have
heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the
United States." This provision in effect preserves the common law
doctrine empowering a trial judge to grant a new trial in his discretion, whenever in his judgment a miscarriage of justice may have
resulted, or if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, or
an allowance of damages is excessive, or for any other reason required to achieve the ends of justice. 6 The proposed North Dakota
rule contains an express enumeration of eight specific grounds on
any one of which a new trial may be granted. The danger in such
an enumeration is that there is a possibility of a contingency arising in which justice requires the granting of a new trial, but which
may not have been foreseen by the draftsmen of the rule. There is
always an advantage in a general formula.
The second and perhaps even more important divergence between the Federal and proposed North Dakota rule as to motions
for a new trial, is found in the time within which such a motion
may be made. Under the Federal rule such a motion may be made
only within ten days after the entry of judgment. The proposed
North Dakota rule would authorize such a motion at any time within six months after verdict if it is made on the ground of newly
6. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 325 (4th Cir. 1941);
-Garrison v. United States, 62 F.2d 41, 42 (4th Cir. 1932); Applebaum v. United States,
-274 Fed. 43, 46 (7th Cir. 1921); Mt. Adams & E. P. Inclined Ry. Co. v. Lowery, 74
Fed. 463, 470, 472 (6th Cir. 1896); United States v. Robinson, 71 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C.
1947).
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discovered evidence,. or within 60 days if made on any other
ground. There seems to be sound basis for not limiting motions
for a new trial to the short ten day period when made on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, for it is reasonable to assume
that newly discovered evidence in most cases will not be found
within ten days after verdict, but if at all, at some later period. It
may perhaps be cogently argued that the Federal rule is defective
in this respect. On the other hand, to allow 60 days instead of ten
days for the making of a motion for a new trial on the customary
ground that the verdict is against the weight of evidence, seems
contrary to the public interest. All those desirous of advancing the
administration of justice are endeavoring to take all steps reasonably possible to reduce delays to a minimum. The writer is not
aware of any hardship that has resulted from limiting an ordinary
motion for a new trial to the ten-day period in the interests of
expediting disposition of cases. If, for example, a plaintiff in a
personal injury case recovers damages, why should he be required
to wait before collecting the judgment, until defendant's counsel
makes a motion for a new trial, which is generally perfunctory
and which is usually denied, on the 59th or 60th day after verdict?
The question answers itself.
The writer has endeavored to analyze the principal differences
between the Federal and the proposed North Dakota rules. It will
be perceived that they are few and most of them are not of major
consequence. There are a few others of such a minor character as
to require no comment. It is hoped that before long the proposed
Rules will be adopted in North Dakota, and that great State will
join the group of those that have adopted the simplest civil procedure yet devised in the United States.

